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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No: 15-2326
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
JOSEPH RAGNOLI,
Appellant
_______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Crim. No. 2-05-cr-00375-3)
District Judge: The Honorable Juan R. Sánchez
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 5, 2016
Before: AMBRO and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed: April 15, 2016)
______________
OPINION **
______________
THOMPSON, District Judge.
*

The Honorable Anne E. Thompson, District Judge for the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.
**

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Joseph Ragnoli (“Ragnoli”) appeals the May 7, 2015 letter communication of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stating that Ragnoli’s
60-month term of confinement is to run consecutive to his state court term of
imprisonment. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to
consider Ragnoli’s appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 29, 2005, law enforcement agents searched Ragnoli’s home pursuant to a
search warrant and found over two kilograms of methamphetamine. On August 12, 2005,
Ragnoli pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute, and one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The District
Court sentenced him to 84 months’ imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release.
After serving his term of imprisonment, Ragnoli was released and began serving his term
of supervised release on January 26, 2011.
Three months later, the Pennsylvania State Police learned Ragnoli was engaging in
multiple methamphetamine transactions via wiretaps that were part of a larger
methamphetamine trafficking investigation. Ragnoli was arrested on November 27,
2012. On January 30, 2013, Ragnoli and 27 other individuals were charged with multiple
offenses related to the distribution of methamphetamine.
On April 25, 2013, while Ragnoli was in state custody on his pending state
charges, he was brought before the District Court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum for violating his supervised release. Ragnoli stipulated that he had
violated his supervised release and was sentenced to the maximum statutory penalty of 60
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months’ imprisonment. The Court did not specify if the 60-month term was to run
consecutively or concurrently with the sentence that would be imposed in Ragnoli’s
pending state case, nor did Ragnoli’s counsel raise the issue. Ragnoli did not appeal the
District Court’s judgment. He was immediately returned to state custody, and the federal
judgment was filed as a detainer.
On May 30, 2013, Ragnoli pled guilty to two of his pending state charges. He was
sentenced to 24 to 48 months’ incarceration, which the State Court ordered “to be served
concurrent and coterminous to the Federal Sentence he is currently serving.” App. 73.
Ragnoli served his state sentence, and was released to federal custody on December 3,
2014.
In a letter dated March 26, 2015, Jose A. Santana, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
Regional Inmate Systems Administrator, sent a letter to the District Court regarding
Ragnoli. App. 79. The letter explained that Ragnoli had requested that the BOP run his
federal sentence concurrently with his state sentence. The BOP could accomplish this by
retroactively designating the state prison as the institution for service of Ragnoli’s federal
sentence. This retroactive designation would reduce the total amount of time Ragnoli
spent in custody, as the State Court had ordered. The letter indicated that it is the BOP’s
“preference” to obtain the federal sentencing court’s position on any such retroactive
designations, but that the BOP would make its own decision if it had not heard back from
the District Court within 60 days. If the District Court stated its position within 60 days,
the BOP would designate Ragnoli’s place of imprisonment according to the District
Court’s position.
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On May 7, 2015, the District Court held a conference call with counsel for the
government, Ragnoli’s counsel, and a probation officer. Ragnoli was not present on the
call, and no one objected to his absence. Later that day, the District Court issued a letter
that read:
Joseph Ragnoli’s sentence by this Court on April 25, 2013, to a 60-month
term of confinement for violation of his supervised release is to run
consecutive with his state term of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3,
comment. Nn. 3, 4.
App. 58. Once Ragnoli learned of the District Court’s letter, he filed an appeal, which is
presently before us.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Ragnoli’s sentencing
pursuant to 18 § U.S.C. 3231. We exercise plenary review over the question of whether
we have jurisdiction to consider Ragnoli’s appeal. In re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 94 (3d
Cir. 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
Ragnoli contends that the District Court’s May 7, 2015 letter impermissibly
modified his sentence outside of his presence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 (permitting
sentencing courts to modify sentences under specific circumstances not present in this
case); Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3) (requiring defendant’s presence at sentencing). The
government argues that the May 7, 2015 letter was not a court order, but merely an
advisory letter to the BOP, and therefore cannot form the basis for an appeal before this
Court. The government does not argue that Ragnoli’s appeal of the letter was untimely;
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therefore this issue is waived. United States v. Muhammud, 701 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir.
2012) (stating that the time limits under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) are waived if the
government does not invoke them).
Ragnoli’s arguments depend upon a finding that the May 7, 2015 letter was an
appealable court order. However, when the District Court wrote the letter, it lacked the
authority to issue an order modifying Ragnoli’s sentence. Dillon v. United States, 560
U.S. 817, 819 (2010) (observing that federal courts generally are not able to modify
sentences at a later date); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (listing the exceptional circumstances
when a court may modify a sentence at a later date, none of which are applicable here).
In May 2015, approximately two years after the District Court had sentenced Ragnoli,
only the BOP had the authority to credit Ragnoli for his time in state custody by
retroactively designating his state institution for service of his federal sentence.1 See
Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478 (3d Cir. 1990); 18 U.S.C § 3621(b) (granting the
BOP authority to “designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment.”).
Since the District Court had no authority to modify its earlier sentencing order,
and the BOP had independent authority to decide whether to credit Ragnoli for his time
in state custody, the District Court’s letter was only a non-binding recommendation to the
BOP, not an appealable order. This reasoning is in accord with our own case law, and the
law of multiple other circuits. United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 778 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that the portion of a district court’s order that included a specific place of
The District Court could have ordered Ragnoli’s sentence to run consecutively or
concurrently with his anticipated state sentence at Ragnoli’s 2013 sentencing hearing.
Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012).
1
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imprisonment was only a non-binding recommendation to the BOP, and therefore not
appealable); United States v. Ceballos, 671 F.3d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that
district courts’ non-binding recommendations to the BOP are not appealable); United
States v. Kerr, 472 F.3d 517, 520 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a “non-binding
recommendation to the BOP is not reviewable as it is not a final decision of the district
court”); United States v. Melendez, 279 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that nonbinding recommendations to the BOP are not reviewable orders); United States v.
Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a district court’s recommendation
that the BOP not credit the defendant for his time in state custody was not appealable
because the district court’s recommendation was not binding on the BOP).
Since the District Court’s letter was not an appealable order, we lack jurisdiction
over Ragnoli’s appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (limiting our jurisdiction to appeals of “final
decisions” from lower courts, except when direct review may be had before the Supreme
Court). However, there is an avenue for Ragnoli to appeal the BOP’s decision. The BOP
Administrative Remedy Program, 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et seq., sets forth a formal review
process that Ragnoli can pursue in challenging the BOP’s decision. Ragnoli has not yet
utilized this process. Ragnoli must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking
judicial review, which he may seek thereafter by filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, if his administrative appeal is unsuccessful. Setser, 132
S. Ct. at 1473; Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). We
express no view as to whether those proceedings would be successful.
IV. CONCLUSION
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When “we determine that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal, our ‘only
function remaining [will be] that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’”
Elliott v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in
original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).
Therefore, this case will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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